ANALYSIS


Total: 722 models have been designed.



This Analysis report shows the specific features of models submitted by users. Although this information is presented in the form of a survey, the Design Democracy website does not have strict safeguards to prevent multiple submissions of the same or different models by the same person or group. Please be aware of this limitation when using the data in this report.

PART 1
Power to nominate Chief Executive candidates
Q1. Who should have the power to nominate Chief Executive candidates?

13.9% (100 models)
i. Only a nominating committee.

44.4% (320 models)
ii. A nominating committee and members of the public (including institutions).

41.7% (300 models)
iii. Only members of the public (including institutions). You will be directed to Part 6 if you choose this answer.


Q1(i)
13.9%
Q1(ii)
44.4%
Q1(iii)
41.7%


PART 2
Design the size of the Nominating Committee
Q1. How many members should the Nominating Committee have?

16% (67 models)
i. 1200 (the size of the existing Election Committee).

52.9% (222 models)
ii. More than 1200.

7.9% (33 models)
iii. Less than 1200.

23.6% (99 models)
iv. Not sure.


Q1(i)
16%
Q1(ii)
52.9%
Q1(iii)
7.9%
Q1(iv)
23.6%


PART 3
Design the composition of the Nominating Committee
Q1. How should the composition of the Nominating Committee be structured?

18.1% (76 models)
i. Use the existing Election Committee'€™s 4 sectors and 38 subsectors.

20% (84 models)
ii. Use the existing Election Committee'€™s 4 sectors but different subsectors.

46% (193 models)
iii. Use different sectors from those of the existing Election Committee.

16.7% (70 models)
iv. Not sure.


Q1(i)
18.1%
Q1(ii)
20%
Q1(iii)
46%
Q1(iv)
16.7%


PART 4
Design the electorate base of the Nominating Committee
Q1. Who should be entitled to elect the members of the Nominating Committee?

5% (21 models)
i. Use the existing Election Committee'€™s electorate base.

74% (311 models)
ii. Use the general electorate.

5% (76 models)
iii. Use an electorate base larger than that of the existing Election Committee but smaller than the general electorate.

0.7% (3 models)
iv. Use an electorate base smaller than that of the existing Election Committee.

2.9% (12 models)
v. Not sure.


Q1(i)
5%
Q1(ii)
74%
Q1(iii)
18.1%
Q1(iv)
0.7%
Q1(v)
2.9%



Q2. Should corporate voting be used to elect some members of the Nominating Committee?

9.5% (40 models)
i. Yes.

81.9% (344 models)
ii. No.

9.3% (39 models)
iii. Not Sure.


Q2(i)
9.5%
Q2(ii)
81.9%
Q2(iii)
9.3%


PART 5
Design the method of nominating Chief Executive candidates
Q1. Should members of the Nominating Committee be required to vote (by secret ballot) to nominate candidates?

43.1% (181 models)
i. No.

49.3% (207 models)
ii. Yes.

8.3% (35 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q1(i)
43.1%
Q1(ii)
49.3%
Q1(iii)
8.3%


Q2. To become a Chief Executive candidate, should a person have to obtain a minimum number of nominations from Nominating Committee members? What minimum percentage of support from Nominating Committee members should be needed?

74% (311 models)
i. Yes.

16.4% (69 models)
ii. No.

10.2% (43 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q2(i)
74%
Q2(ii)
16.4%
Q2(iii)
10.2%


Q3. Should a minimum number of nominations have to come from a particular sector(s) of the Nominating Committee?

69.8% (293 models)
i. No.

21% (88 models)
ii. Yes.

10% (42 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q3(i)
69.8%
Q3(ii)
21%
Q3(iii)
10%


Q4. Should there be a cap on the number of nominated candidates?

67.4% (283 models)
i. No.

27.4% (115 models)
ii. Yes.

6% (25 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q4(i)
67.4%
Q4(ii)
27.4%
Q4(iii)
6%


Q5. Should candidates be allowed to obtain more nominations than the minimum number for candidacy?

64.8% (272 models)
i. Yes.

21.9% (92 models)
ii. No.

14% (59 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q5(i)
64.8%
Q5(ii)
21.9%
Q5(iii)
14%


Q6. Should nominations by Nominating Committee members be secret in the sense that the identity of the member making the nomation will not be made public?

46.9% (197 models)
i. No.

46.2% (194 models)
ii. Yes.

7.6% (32 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q6(i)
46.9%
Q6(ii)
46.2%
Q6(iii)
7.6%


Q7. Should Nominating Committee members be allowed to nominate more than one person?

57.4% (241 models)
i. No.

37.1% (156 models)
ii. Yes.

6.2% (26 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q7(i)
57.4%
Q7(ii)
37.1%
Q7(iii)
6.2%


PART 6
Design the election method for the Chief Executive
Q1. Should the Chief Executive be allowed to be a member of a political party?

18.6% (134 models)
i. No.

76% (547 models)
ii. Yes.

6.5% (47 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q1(i)
18.6%
Q1(ii)
76%
Q1(iii)
6.5%


Q2. Should a minimum voter turnout (of the registered general electorate) be set for a Chief Executive election, such that if the voter turnout fails to reach the minimum voter turnout set, the election will be declared null and void€“ and a new election must be arranged (applying this same rule)?

26.3% (189 models)
i. No.

61.8% (445 models)
ii. Yes.

13.1% (94 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q2(i)
26.3%
Q2(ii)
61.8%
Q2(iii)
13.1%


Q3. Should the Chief Executive candidate who obtains the greatest number of votes - from votes cast by members of the general electorate who vote in the election - be returned as the elected Chief Executive? This would be a first-past-the-post method of election.

36.5% (263 models)
i. Yes.

54.4% (392 models)
ii. No.

10.1% (73 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q3(i)
36.5%
Q3(ii)
54.4%
Q3(iii)
10.1%


Q4. If there is only one Chief Executive candidate, should the candidate have to obtain the support of a minimum proportion of registered voters in a general election before appointment by the Central People's Government as the Chief Executive?

80.3% (578 models)
i. Yes.

11.8% (85 models)
ii. No.

9% (65 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q4(i)
80.3%
Q4(ii)
11.8%
Q4(iii)
9%


Q5. Should a Chief Executive candidate have to receive a minimum proportion of all votes cast in a general election before he or she can be returned as the elected Chief Executive?

71.3% (513 models)
i. Yes.

18.6% (134 models)
ii. No.

11.3% (81 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q5(i)
71.3%
Q5(ii)
18.6%
Q5(iii)
11.3%


Q6. In an election with three or more Chief Executive candidates, how should the system deal with the situation of no candidate having the minimum proportion of votes cast?

68.4% (351 models)
i. A second election, €œRun-Off Election€, should be held where only the two candidates ranking first and second in the €œFirst Election€ compete, in order to ascertain which candidate has received both the highest number of votes and the required minimum proportion of votes cast.

25% (128 models)
ii. Voters should be required to rank their preference for Chief Executive candidates (e.g. marking 1, 2, 3 and so on) so that the final election result can be decided according to a system of preferential voting without the need for a €œRun-Off Election€.

3.7% (19 models)
iii. Another alternative.

2.9% (15 models)
iv. Not sure.


Q6(i)
68.4%
Q6(ii)
25%
Q6(iii)
3.7%
Q6(iv)
2.9%


Q7. In an election with only two Chief Executive candidates, should the winning candidate still have to obtain the minimum proportion of votes cast?

88.3% (453 models)
i. Yes.

9% (46 models)
ii. No.

2.7% (14 models)
iii. Not sure.


Q7(i)
88.3%
Q7(ii)
9%
Q7(iii)
2.7%

ANALYSIS


Total: 16 models have been designed.



This Analysis report shows the specific features of models submitted by users. Although this information is presented in the form of a survey, the Design Democracy website does not have strict safeguards to prevent multiple submissions of the same or different models by the same person or group. Please be aware of this limitation when using the data in this report.

PART 1
Size of the Legislative Council
Q1. Should the size of the Legislative Council be reformed?

50% (8 models)
i. No, keep it at 70 members.

43.8% (7 models)
ii. Yes, make it bigger.

0% (0 models)
iii. Yes, make it smaller.

6.3% (1 models)
iv. Not sure.


Q1(i)
50%
Q1(ii)
43.8%
Q1(iii)
0%
Q1(iv)
6.3%
PART 2
Reform of the Functional Constituencies
Q1. Should all functional constituency seats be abolished?

6.3% (1 models)
i. No.

81.3% (13 models)
ii. Yes.

12.5% (2 models)
iii. Not sure.

Q1(i)
6.3%
Q1(ii)
81.3%
Q1(iii)
12.5%


Q2. Should functional constituency seats be made into an upper house of the Legislative Council?

66.7% (2 models)
i. No.

33.3% (1 models)
ii. Yes.

0% (0 models)
iii. Not sure.

Q2(i)
66.7%
Q2(ii)
33.3%
Q2(iii)
0%


Q3. How should the functional constituency seats be designed/redesigned?

0% (0 models)
i. There should be no change to their current proportion and design.

33.3% (1 models)
ii. Their proportion should remain the same but their design changed.

33.3% (1 models)
iii. Their proportion should be reduced and their design changed.

33.3% (1 models)
iv. Other.

0% (0 models)
v. Not sure.

Q3(i)
0%
Q3(ii)
33.3%
Q3(iii)
33.3%
Q3(iv)
33.3%
Q3(v)
0%


Q4. Should corporate voting in functional constituencies be abolished?

0% (0 models)
i. No.

66.7% (2 models)
ii. Yes.

33.3% (1 models)
iii. Not sure.

Q4(i)
0%
Q4(ii)
66.7%
Q4(iii)
33.3%


Q5. Should Article II of Annex II of the Basic Law be amended to abolish the split voting mechanism?

0% (0 models)
i. No.

100% (3 models)
ii. Yes.

0% (0 models)
iii. Not sure.

Q5(i)
0%
Q5(ii)
100%
Q5(iii)
0%


PART 3
Legislative Council Elections (Geographical Constituencies)
Q1. Should there be any reform of the five geographical constituencies?

25% (4 models)
i. No.

56.3% (9 models)
ii. Yes, there should be more than five constituencies.

18.8% (3 models)
iii. Other.

0% (0 models)
iv. Not sure.


Q1(i)
25%
Q1(ii)
56.3%
Q1(iii)
18.8%
Q1(iv)
0%


Q2. Should there be any reform of the current voting system, whch is known as a list system of proportional representation?

25% (4 models)
i. No.

62.5% (10 models)
ii. Yes.

12.5% (2 models)
iii. Not sure.

Q2(i)
25%
Q2(ii)
62.5%
Q2(iii)
12.5%